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INTRODUCTION 
According to the United States Patent Act, a patent holder is granted exclu-
sivity for twenty years.1  Within this bundle of exclusive rights is the right to 
make, use, offer for sale, sell, or import into the United States.2  In addition, it 
 
*Judicial Law clerk to the Honorable Judge Robert A. Molloy, in the Complex Litigation Division, 
United States Virgin Island, previously Assistant Attorney General in the Territory of Guam, J.D., 
2017, Marquette Law School, Member of IPLR 2016-2017, Bachelor of Science in Nursing from the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison.  The author thanks her mentors at the United States District Court—
Eastern District of Wisconsin, the United States District Court—Western District of Wisconsin, and 
the United States Court of Federal Claims, in Washington DC.  The author, also, thanks the editors of 
MIPLR, especially McKenzie Subart, for their input.  Admitted to practice in Wisconsin, Guam, and 
has successfully litigated before the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, has published 
for the American Bar Association, and spoke before the Intellectual Property Law Division of the 
ABA.  The opinions in this Article are the Author’s alone and do not reflect the views of the Judiciary 
of the Virgin Islands.  
1. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012), amended by Pub. L. 112-211 (Supp. V 2018).  Generally, the 
term of a new patent is twenty years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in 
the United States.  Id. 
2. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“Every patent . . . grant[s] to the patentee . . . the right to ex-
clude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States 
or importing the invention into the United States . . . .”).  A patent is a property right issued by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”).  35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012), amended by Pub. 
L. 112-211 (Supp. V 2018).  The patent right is for a limited time.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012), 
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provides for the exclusive right to license the use of a named and described 
invention.3  However, the exception to these rights is compulsory licensing.4  
Compulsory licensing operates when government authorities license a patent, 
under certain conditions, without the patent holder’s permission.5  On the inter-
national stage, the original authority is the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property (the “Paris Convention”), which protects patents filed in 
a foreign country where the patented product or process is marketed and sold.6 
“The Paris Convention has been revised from time to time . . . .  Each of the 
revision conferences, starting with the Brussels Conference in 1900, ended with 
the adoption of a revised Act of the Paris Convention.”7  With a few excep-
tions,8 all those earlier Acts are still current and form the legal basis of the Trade 
 
amended by Pub. L. 112-211 (Supp. V 2018); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall 
have power . . . to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”).  In exchange 
for the patent right, a public disclosure of the invention is required.  Patent, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/patent [https://perma.cc/X4NL-C4GV] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). 
3. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012), amended by Pub. L. 112-211 (Supp. V 2018) (“Applications for 
patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing.  The 
applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an 
exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents . . . .”). 
4. Exceptions and Limitations to Patent Rights, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/patents/en/top-
ics/exceptions_limitations.html [https://perma.cc/722W-L5QR] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). 
5. Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WTO: TRIPS AND HEALTH: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pub-
lic_health_faq_e.htm [https://perma.cc/M7AF-3B2F] (last visited May 9, 2017).  Compulsory licens-
ing is one of the flexibilities on patent protection included in the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement.  Id. 
6. Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883), WIPO 
(Sept. 21, 2019), https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html 
[https://perma.cc/BT6Q-RFU2]; John N. Adams, History of the Patent System, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PATENT LAW AND THEORY 2, 25 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2019).  “A Diplomatic Con-
ference convened in Paris in 1883, which ended with final approval and signature of the Paris Conven-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property . . . signed by 11 States: Belgium, Brazil, El Salvador, 
France, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland.”  WIPO Intellec-
tual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use, WIPO 241 (2004), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pub-
docs/en/wipo_pub_489.pdf [https://perma.cc/72LS-ETV6].  Great Britain, Tunisia and Ecuador also 
joined when the Paris Convention went into effect on July 7, 1884.  Id.  After 1950, membership 
increased significantly.  See generally Contracting Parties > Paris Convention (Total Contracting 
Parties: 177), WIPO: WIPO-ADMINISTERED TREATIES, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Show-
Results.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=ANY&end_year=ANY&search_what=C&treaty_id=2 
[https://perma.cc/MA94-AU9X] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). 
7. WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use, supra note 6, at 241–42. 
8. Id. at 242.  “With the exception of the Acts concluded at the revision conferences of Brussels 
(1897 and 1900) and Washington, D.C. (1911), which are no longer in force,” the remainder of the 
Paris Convention is largely intact; it forms the statutory framework for the Intellectual Property agree-
ments to follow.  Id. 
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) Agreement.9  The World 
Trade Organization (the “WTO”) adopted the Declaration on the TRIPS Agree-
ment and Public Health (the “Doha Declaration”) in 2001, which reaffirmed 
compulsory licensing as a way to combat global public health issues of access 
to medicines in low- and middle-income countries (“LMICs”).10  Notably, India 
and China have been late additions to the early agreements but extremely punc-
tual in adopting the Doha Declaration, which allows broader compulsory li-
censing.11 
This paper will examine the challenges of international compulsory licens-
ing by examining the issue historically and legally as well as offer possible 
solutions.  Thus, this paper will explore the challenge of balancing corporate 
interests against the affordability and availability of pharmaceuticals by focus-
ing on discrete situations in developing countries, the history of compulsory 
licensing, and how the World Health Organization (the “WHO”) and the WTO 
have attempted to tackle these challenges through compulsory licensing, and it 
will suggest a possible framework for use in arbitration, which balances equi-
ties through a Georgia-Pacific analysis. 
Part I discusses the equities of patent owners versus consumers who live in 
developing countries.  Part II discusses the history of compulsory licensing.  
Part III reviews some of the WTO’s attempts to settle international disputes, 
along with the financial implications of settlement with individual countries on 
a case-by-case basis.  Part IV examines how Georgia-Pacific12 can be used as 
a guide for arbitration in international patent disputes in compulsory licensing 
as applied to some discrete compulsory licensing cases. 
 
9. See Part I–General Provisions and Basic Principles, WTO: URUGUAY ROUND 
AGREEMENT: TRIPS, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_03_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/G4CX-6CVX] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019) (stating the text of Article 2, which is 
about intellectual property conventions). 
10. See Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since 
the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLOS MED. 1, 2 (2012). 
11. See Vanessa Bradford Kerry & Kelley Lee, TRIPS, the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 
6 Decision: What are the Remaining Steps for Protecting Access to Medicines?, 3 GLOBALIZATION & 
HEALTH 1, 3 (2007) (“The 2005 date of compliance for most LMICs includes countries that are major 
suppliers of generic drugs such as India, Brazil and China.”) (citing Janice M. Mueller, Taking Trips 
to India–Novartis, Patent Law and Access to Medicines, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 541–43 (2007)); see 
also India Accedes to Paris Convention, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y: THE HINDU BUS. LINE 
(Feb. 15, 1999), https://www.iatp.org/news/india-accedes-to-paris-convention 
[https://perma.cc/PM5W-WL3N] (discussing the Indian government’s decision to join the Paris Con-
vention in 1998); Paris Notification No. 114: Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty, Accession by the People’s Republic of China, WIPO: WIPO-ADMINISTERED TREATIES: 
NOTIFICATIONS, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/paris/treaty_paris_114.html 
[https://perma.cc/U8JP-Q2DF] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (stating that China will become a member 
of the Paris Union on March 19, 1985). 
12. Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub 
nom. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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I.  BALANCING EQUITIES: PATENT HOLDERS VS. THIRD WORLD CONSUMERS 
The affordability and availability of pharmaceuticals are often viewed, and 
generally framed, as one of supply and demand; yet the issue is much more 
complicated than that.13  The cost of bringing a single drug to market is stag-
gering.14  The cost to bring one new drug to market is now estimated at more 
than 2.6 billion dollars.15  Most companies seek to recoup these research and 
development expenses after a drug becomes successful in the marketplace.16  
This success also has to offset the expenses of complex double-blind clinical 
trials, the greater focus on chronic and degenerative diseases, and test-seeking 
to demonstrate comparative drug effectiveness data.17  In addition to these 
costs, the cost of drugs that are unsuccessful must also be figured into the anal-
ysis.18 
In stark contrast to corporate billions spent on pharmaceutical development 
are individual consumers in impoverished developing and third-world countries 
with limited resources to spend on medicines.19  In LMICs, up to 90% of the 
population pays for medicine on an out-of-pocket basis; it is the largest house-
hold expense after food.20  The burden is especially great for a family needing 
 
13. See Glenna M. Crooks et al., Pharmaceutical Marketplace Dynamics, NAT’L POL’Y 
HEALTH F., No. 755 1, 2 (2000), https://www.nhpf.org/library/issue-briefs/IB755_RxMarketplace_5-
31-00.pdf [https://perma.cc/D92G-5U9L] (“Hardly a day has gone by lately without some new reflec-
tion of the tension between commercial and scientific accomplishments of the drug companies on one 
hand, and the disparity of the spread of the benefits of those accomplishments [on the other].”). 
14. See Rick Mullin, Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $2.5 Billion, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cost-to-develop-
new-pharmaceutical-drug-now-exceeds-2-5b/ [https://perma.cc/4J4Z-UKY2]; see also Rick Mullin, 
Tufts Study Finds Big Rise in Cost of Drug Development, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Nov. 20, 
2014), https://cen.acs.org/articles/92/web/2014/11/Tufts-Study-Finds-Big-Rise.html 
[https://perma.cc/G4KW-NBX8] (“[T]he cost of developing a prescription drug that gains market ap-
proval [is] $2.6 billion, a 145% increase, correcting for inflation, over the estimate the center made in 
2003.”). 
15. Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $2.5 Billion, supra note 14 
(“[T]he Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America in particular, is really going to use [the 
cost of research and development] to justify the high cost of drugs.” (quoting John LaMattina, senior 
partner at PureTech and former Pfizer R&D head) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
16. Ingrid Torjesen, Drug Development: The Journey of a Medicine from Lab to Shelf, 
PHARMACEUTICAL J.: TOMORROW’S PHARMACIST (May 12, 2015), https://www.pharmaceutical-jour-
nal.com/publications/tomorrows-pharmacist/drug-development-the-journey-of-a-medicine-from-lab-
to-shelf/20068196.article?firstPass=false [https://perma.cc/3MDE-U45J]. 
17. Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $ 2.5 Billion, supra note 14. 
18. Tufts Study Finds Big Rise in Cost of Drug Development, supra note 14 (providing that the 
principal investigator and director of economic analysis commented that the high cost of failure in drug 
development figured into the analysis). 
19. See Suerie Moon, Powerful Ideas for Global Access to Medicines, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
505, 505–06 (2017) (noting that a U.N. work group recommended drug pricing transparency as one of 
the solutions to access in LMICs). 
20. WHO Guideline on Country Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies, WHO 1 (2015), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/153920/9789241549035_eng.pdf?sequence=1 
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treatment for several conditions at the same time.  For example, using the low-
est priced generic medicines would take at least 17 days’ wages for the lowest 
paid, unskilled government worker to purchase medicine for a child with 
asthma, or an adult with diabetes, or an adult with a peptic ulcer.21  When one 
examines utilizing treatment with an innovative brand, it would require 106 
days’ salary for a month’s worth of treatment.22 
According to the WHO, generic medicines can range from 1.9 to 3.5 times 
the International Reference Price (the “IRP”), while in India, for example, es-
sential medicines cost between 1.6 to 2.3 days’ wages for the lowest-paid gov-
ernment worker—and 80% of the population earns less than this wage.23  In 
these countries, medicine accounts for 20% to 60% of health spending com-
pared to 18% in countries with more advanced economic development.24  This 
means that for over 90% of the population in developing countries, medicine is 
no longer affordable, and the cost is a major burden on government budgets.25 
In India, for example, the cost of asthma medicine can amount to nearly 
three days’ wages for a government worker.26  However, as previously men-
tioned, most of the population earns less than an average government worker.27  
In terms of availability, Beclomethasone28 and Salbutamol29 were available in 
only 25% to 30% of the public health care facilities in only one of the five 
Indian states included in the study.30  The price of these medications was 0.74 
and 0.56 times higher than the IRP.31 
 
[https://perma.cc/KT5L-QH7E].  
21. See Medicine Price Surveys and Proposed Interventions to Improve Sustainable Access to 
Affordable Medicines in 6 Sub-Saharan African Countries, WHO 1 (2006), https://apps.who.int/med-
icinedocs/documents/s14864b/s14864b.pdf [https://perma.cc/BHE7-STUW]. 
22. Id. 
23. Alexandra Cameron, Margaret Ewen, Martin Auton & Dele Abegunde, The World Medi-
cines Situation 2011: Medicine Prices, Availability and Affordability, WHO 1 (2011), 
https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/world_medicines_situation/WMS_ch6_wPricing_v6.pdf 
 [https://perma.cc/5Y5X-4SH5] (“[The] average prices of generic medicines range from 1.9 to 3.5 
times international reference prices . . . .”); A. Kotwani, Availability, Price and Affordability of Asthma 
Medicines in Five Indian States, 13 INT’L J. TUBERCULOSIS & LUNG DISEASE 574, 574 (2009). 
24. WHO Guideline on Country Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies, supra note 20, at 1. 
25. Id. 
26. Kotwani, supra note 23, at 574. 
27. Id. 
28. See Beclomethasone Inhalation, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/mtm/beclome-
thasone-inhalation.html [https://perma.cc/TBP2-XGRA] (last visited May 9, 2017) (stating that Be-
clomethasone is a steroid that prevents the release of substances in the body that cause inflammation, 
and it is used to prevent asthma). 
29. See Salbutamol (Inhalation), DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/cons/salbutamol.html 
[https://perma.cc/7L2T-CA6T] (last visited May 9, 2017) (stating that the generic name of Salbutamol 
is Albuterol).  Albuterol was originally approved by the FDA in 1981.  See id. at Approval History. 
30. See Kotwani, supra note 23, at 574. 
31. Id. 
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When it comes to an integrated delivery system, like an inhaler, the availa-
bility of asthma medicine continues to plummet.  In India, the availability of 
inhalers was poor in the private sector of four of the states studied, with some 
as low as only 10% of the private facilities having access to inhalers.32  More-
over, when it comes to price, Beclomethasone was 0.87 to 1.49 times higher 
than the IRP, and Salbutamol was 0.86 to 1.12 times higher than the IRP.33  
Thus, essential medicines for asthma, which are used daily and on a long-term 
basis, are unaffordable.34  Finally, in the public sector, where low-income pop-
ulations seek treatment, “[s]teroid inhalers were not [as] readily available [as] 
in the private sector.”35  Thus, essential asthma medicines were either unafford-
able for the majority of the population36 and/or largely unavailable for the low-
income population.37  Consequently, it becomes difficult to strike a balance be-
tween pharmaceutical companies’ interests in their patents—and related in-
come streams that fund new research and development—and individual coun-
tries’ public health concerns exacerbated by the weaknesses within their 
economies.  For these reasons, an enormous tension exists between the rights 
of the international patent holder and the public health needs within developing 
and third-world countries. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 
Meanwhile, the subject of compulsory licensing has rarely surfaced in the 
United States in association with pharmaceutical patents.38  This is largely due 
to the public interest, property rights, and the perception that it would impact 








38. Grace K. Avedissian, Comment, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift To-
ward Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of “Super-Terrorism,” 18 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 237, 252, 245 n. 35 (2002) (citing Amy C. Carroll, Comment, Not Always the Best 
Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2433, 2469 
(1995)).  Compulsory licensing in the United States has been used in copyright in literary and artistic 
works, but rarely in pharmaceuticals due to the public interest in the development of technology, an 
interest in property rights, and, arguably, by the lobbying efforts of pharmaceutical companies.  See 
generally Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing 
Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 953–54 (2000); William N. Monte, Compulsory Li-
censing of Patents, 25 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 247, 247–71 (2016). 
39. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceu-
tical 
Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 247, 247–48 (2009).  During the 2001 
anthrax attacks, the United States government threatened to issue a compulsory license for 
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in the United States outweigh individual interests.  Lobbying by large corpora-
tions generally overshadows individual and small-group lobbying efforts by 
consumers.40  However, on an international level, due to the large disparity in 
cost and unavailability, developing countries are seeking compulsory licenses 
of pharmaceuticals.41  This disparity between the cost and availability of phar-
maceuticals was never more apparent than during the AIDS epidemic in Sub-
Saharan Africa, like Kenya, for example.42  At that time, the WTO called com-
pulsory licensing and access to AIDS medications a pressing public health is-
sue.43  In fact, other countries like Canada temporarily manufactured some 
AIDS and anti-malaria medicines in response to this public health issue and 
exported them to African countries under a compulsory licensing scheme.44  
The program was later rescinded.45 
Many impoverished third-world countries have made compelling cases for 
the expansion of compulsory licensing as a public health initiative.46  The past 
ten years have seen the introduction of several initiatives to support countries 
in managing pharmaceutical prices.47  However, it was felt that special 
 
Ciprofloxacin if Bayer did not lower the price for the government.  Id.  Bayer lowered the price, and 
the government backed down on the threat.  Id. 
40. See Amy C. Carroll, Comment, Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology and the 
Global Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2433, 2469 (1995); see also Ellen Daniel, US 
Pharma Lobbying Spend Surged to 25.4 million in 2017, PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/news/us-pharma-lobbying-spend-surged-25-4m-2017 
[https://perma.cc/RDV6-6G6V]. 
41. See generally Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation, Intersections Be-
tween Public Health, Intellectual Property and Trade: Extract From the WHO-WIPO-WTO Trilateral 
Study, WTO (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/who-wipo-
wto2013_par6_extract_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/S496-4XQ9]; see also Chapter 4: Medical Technolo-
gies: The Access Dimension, WTO: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: WHO–WIPO–WTO BOOK, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trilatweb_e/ch4c_trilat_web_13_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E33V-K5TQ] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019); John LaMattina, India’s Solution to Drug 
Costs: Ignore Patents and Control Prices Except for Home Grown Drugs, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2013), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2013/04/08/indias-solution-to-drug-costs-ignore-patents-
and-control-prices-except-for-home-grown-drugs/#491c664f2cba [https://perma.cc/3KTX-6TSC] 
(“The Glivec situation is not unique. . . .  [Compulsory] licenses allow India generic drug manufactur-
ers to make these drugs without impunity.”). 
42. See Ben Sihanya, Patents, Parallel Importation and Compulsory Licensing of HIV/AIDS 
Drugs: The Experience of Kenya, WTO: MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION: 
CASE STUDY 19 (July 8, 2011), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/cas-
estudies_e/case19_e.htm [https://perma.cc/M6Y3-4M6N]. 
43. Id. 
44. See Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation, Intersections Between Pub-
lic Health, Intellectual Property and Trade: Extract From the WHO-WIPO-WTO Trilateral Study, 
supra note 41. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See Moon, supra note 19, at 506. 
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consideration was needed in low-income and developing countries, in which 
the pharmaceutical sector was less regulated.48 
Eventually, a committee of countries was formed at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference to address the issue over a period of several years.49  This commit-
tee of countries, working under the auspices of the WTO, determined that the 
public health issues in the countries seeking a compulsory license is of greater 
importance than the rights of an individual corporate patent holder.50  Countries 
such as India, Canada, Mexico, Qatar, and several Sub-Saharan countries, and 
even China, have been seeking compulsory licenses.51  Each of these countries 
has been lobbying the WTO to expand the compulsory licensing on several 
classes of pharmaceuticals.52 
By 2001, via the Doha Declaration, a compulsory licensing exception was 
allowed under the TRIPS Agreement—provided that certain procedures and 
conditions were fulfilled.53  These criteria are the following: (1) a generic copy 
of a drug is produced mainly for the domestic market of that country; (2) it 
should not be made for export; (3) used for a pressing public health need or 
emergency public health situation; (4) the producer of the generic copy has at-
tempted to negotiate a voluntary license on reasonable commercial terms; (5) 
only if the negotiations fail can a compulsory license be issued; and (6) some 
countries require that the patent be active for three to six years before a com-
pulsory license application can be considered.54 
 
48. WHO Guideline on Country Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies, supra note 20, at 3. 
49. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WHO, 
https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en [https://perma.cc/BAF3-S9CP] (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2019); see also Module IX: TRIPS and Public Health, WTO, https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/modules9_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H2G-NDWZ] (last visited Nov. 2, 
2019). 
50. Reichman, supra note 39, at 250. 
51. Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports, WTO NEWS: 2003 PRESS 
RELEASES (Aug. 30, 2003), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8EH8-PZSB]; see also Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Com-
pulsory Licensing: Annex, SCP/30/3, WIPO 20 (May 21, 2019), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_30/scp_30_3-main1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2296-
MYC9]. 
52. Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing 
of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH L. J. 853, 871 (2003); Exceptions and Lim-
itations to Patent Rights: Compulsory Licenses and/or Government Use (Part I), SCP/21/4 Rev., 
WIPO 5 (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_21/scp_21_4_rev.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YLA2-PKKS] (referencing additional reasons given by developing countries to al-
low extended compulsory licensing). 
53. See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, WTO 
(Nov. 20, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2YRB-467B]; see also Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Com-
pulsory Licensing: Annex, supra note 51, at 7–8. 
54. See Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing: Annex, 
supra note 51, at 6–8; Id. at 7–8 (stating that under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, a compulsory 
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The conditions for maintenance of the compulsory license are: (1) the pa-
tent holder shall be paid adequate renumeration in the circumstances of each 
case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization; and (2) the 
generic copy produced cannot be exported out of the country seeking the com-
pulsory license.55  Additionally, after the Doha Declaration, the requirement to 
attempt to obtain a license was relaxed in cases of “national emergency,” “other 
circumstances of extreme urgency,” and “public non-commercial use,” so that 
the first step of negotiating a voluntary license can be bypassed in order to save 
time.56  Despite this expansion of rights by the licensee, the patent owner still 
has to be paid.57 
III.  ENFORCEMENT 
A compulsory license creates a quasi-contractual obligation between the 
patent holder and the licensee, which originates in a Member State and is 
 
license is authorized only under specific conditions, including: (1) the “user has made efforts to obtain 
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such ef-
forts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time,” (2) the compulsory license is limited 
to domestic use, (3) the compulsory license is non-exclusive (generic), (4) the compulsory license is 
not used to create product for export, (5) and the compulsory license is used for a pressing public health 
or emergency); see also id. at 17 (“According to Article 46, at the request of any person made after the 
expiry of a period of four years from the filing date of the patent application or three years from the 
date of grant of the patent . . . .”); Id. at 30 (“In most countries, the time period during which compul-
sory licenses may not be granted on the grounds of non-working or insufficient working is three years 
from the date of the grant of the patent or four years from the filing date of the application.  The 
applicable laws of many of those countries further specify that the said time period lasts three years 
from the date of grant or four years from the filing date, whichever period expires later.  In addition, 
in a few countries, a compulsory license may be granted if the exploitation of the patented invention 
has been interrupted for more than one year [Argentina and Costa Rica], and in two countries, for more 
than three years [Turkey and Ukraine].  Some other variations found in the applicable laws are, for 
example, ‘three years from the date of the grant of the patent’ [Azerbaijan, Brazil, Honduras, Hong 
Kong (China), India, Netherlands, Qatar, and the United Kingdom], ‘three’ or ‘five’ years from the 
date of publication of the mention of the grant [Turkey, Ukraine, and Tajikistan] ‘3 years after sealing’ 
[Australia], or ‘three years of non-working’ [Monaco].”). 
55. See Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing: Annex, 
supra note 51, at 78.  According to Article 31, compulsory licensing is allowed provided “the following 
conditions [are] respected: . . . 
(f) such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member 
authorizing such use; . . . (h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances 
of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization . . . .”  Id.  Under the Paris 
Convention, a special compulsory license is required in order to export a pharmaceutical.  See id. at 6–
9. 
56. Dianne Nicol & Olasupo Owoeye, Using TRIPS Flexibilities to Facilitate Access to Medi-
cines, 91 BULL WORLD HEALTH ORGAN. 533, 533–34 (2013). 
57. Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Pub-
lic Health, WTO (Sept. 1 2003), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/678R-JXUS]. 
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enforced by the WTO.58  Generally, as previously mentioned, there are clear 
criteria that must be satisfied in order to obtain the license and distinct actions 
to avoid.59  But what happens when the contractual compulsory license is 
breached?  Who decides what payment is “adequate” or what constitutes an 
“emergency” or an “urgent situation”?  Which country or organization has ju-
risdiction?  What, if any, enforcement power does that court have?  Some of 
these inherent unresolved issues involved in compulsory licensing, such as ju-
risdiction and enforcement, have been exacerbated by recent compulsory li-
censing disputes. 
The TRIPS Agreement states that the patent owner must be given the right 
to appeal the compensation or the validity of the compulsory license.60  The 
appeal is filed in the country in possession of the compulsory license.61  Addi-
tionally, the 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha decided that countries 
that are unable to manufacture pharmaceuticals should be given opportunities 
to obtain cheaper copies elsewhere.62  This expands the requirement that drugs 
be restricted to the domestic market, provided that certain conditions are met.63 
To make matters more complicated, eleven countries announced that they 
would only import in situations of a national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency: China (including Hong Kong and Macao), Israel, Korea, 
Kuwait, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United Arab 
 
58. See Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing: Annex, 
supra note 51, at 7 (“WTO Member [States] have an obligation to comply, inter alia, with Articles 5A 
of the Paris Convention concerning compulsory licenses.”). 
59. See discussion supra. 
60. See Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing: Annex, 
supra note 51, at 8 (“According to Article 31, where the law of the Member allows for other use of the 
subject matter of patent without authorization of the right holder, the following conditions shall be 
respected: . . . (i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such use shall be 
subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member; 
(j) the decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall be subject to judicial 
review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member . . . .”); see also 
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 5. 
61. See Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing: Annex, 
supra note 51, at 41–42 (discussing many pharmaceutical compulsory licensing appeals filed in Mem-
ber States, one of which was the Raltegravir compulsory patent case filed in Federal Court of Justice 
in Germany). 
62. See Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports, supra note 51; see 
also Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 53, at 2 (“WTO members 
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in 
making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.”). 
63. See Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports, supra note 51; see 
also Sisule F. Musungu & Cecilia Oh, The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can 
They Promote Access to Medicines?, COMMISSION ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. 
HEALTH (CIPIH) 15 (Aug. 2005), https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J3L9-WGXJ]. 
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Emirates.64  However, the TRIPS Agreement requires that if a country plans to 
export a generic copy, they must change the laws within their country that rec-
ognize patented materials.65  This is known as the “Paragraph 6” decision, 
which came out of the Doha Declaration in 2003.66  Thus far, nineteen countries 
have formally informed the TRIPS Council that they have made the required 
changes.67 
In terms of a challenge to a compulsory license, one of the most well-re-
ported compulsory license cases to date is in regard to Novartis’ drug, 
Gleevec,68 a treatment for leukemia.69  The Indian government issued a com-
pulsory license to manufacturer, copy, and produce the drug.70  Novartis sued 
to block the ruling of the Chennai senior court of India, saying that “it violated 
[the] . . . WTO rules on intellectual property that India had adopted.”71  Novartis 
also argued that an adverse ruling against their patent would “stifle the 
 
64. See Roger Kampf, Special Compulsory Licences for Export of Medicines: Key Features of 
WTO Members’ Implementing Legislation, WTO ECON. RES. & STAT. DIVISION (July 31, 2015), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201507_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS75-UPBM]. 
65. Id.  
66. Id. 
67. Id.; Members’ Laws Implementing the ‘Paragraph 6’ System, WTO: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: TRIPS AND HEALTH, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/par6laws_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EDH4-ZVSV] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (listing the following countries that have 
changed their laws in order to have the ability to export: Albania, Australia, Botswana, Canada, China, 
Croatia, Cuba, European Union, Hong Kong, India, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Phil-
ippines, Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, and Chinese Taipei). 
68. See Leslie A. Pray, Gleevec: The Breakthrough in Cancer Treatment, 1 NATURE EDUC. 37 
(2008) (finding that there was a phenomenal success rate of patient’s white blood cell production, 
which returned to a normal range while on Gleevec); see also Gleevec, DRUGS.COM. (July 1, 2019), 
https://www.drugs.com/gleevec.html [https://perma.cc/9ZB2-ZGZA] (stating that Gleevec is ap-
proved for leukemia, bone marrow disorders, and certain tumors of the stomach and digestive system). 
69. LaMattina, supra note 41. 
70. See Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, India’s Supreme Court to Hear Dispute on Drug Pa-
tents, N.Y. TIMES, at B1 (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/business/global/indias-
supreme-court-to-hear-long-simmering-dispute-on-drug-patents.html?mtr-
ref=www.google.com&gwh=F46019393E275FAA4D4D24E6E9405F26&gwt=pay&assetType=RE
GIWALL [https://perma.cc/RTJ7-9S6G]; see also Roger Collier, Drug Patents: The Evergreening 
Problem, 185 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N E385, E385–86 (2013) (discussing the Indian Supreme Court’s 
refusal to issue a patent to Novartis for a new version of its cancer drug Gleevec).  The Indian govern-
ment allowed some generic manufacturers in India to produce Gleevec in India.  See Sarah Hiddleston, 
Finally, the Patents Prevail, THE HINDU (Apr. 7, 2013), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/fi-
nally-the-patients-prevail/article4588890.ece [https://perma.cc/LC4N-8V63].  Novartis applied for ex-
clusive marketing rights under the Indian Patent Act—which would effectively prohibit the generic 
manufacture of Gleevec in India.  See id.  In 2005, India notified the TRIPS Council of changes to its 
intellectual property standards dealing with incremental changes in a drug which extends the life of a 
patent.  See id.  Minor changes to extend the patent life of a drug is otherwise known as “evergreening.”  
See id. 
71. T.V. Padma, Indian Court Rejects Novartis Patent, NATURE (Apr. 1, 2013), 
https://www.nature.com/news/indian-court-rejects-novartis-patent-1.12717 [https://perma.cc/9K3K-
GETE]. 
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country’s access to new medicines.”72  In 2007, the court rejected Novartis’ 
challenge.73  Novartis then appealed to the Indian Supreme Court in 2009.74  
However, the Indian Supreme Court rejected Novartis’ claim based on section 
3(d) of the Indian Patent Act,75 which states that: 
 
the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does 
not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance 
or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known 
substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus 
unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least 
one new reactant.76 
 
The Indian Supreme Court also rejected Novartis’ expectation that making 
minor changes to their drug would provide extended patent protection for an-
other twenty years.77  The Court ruled that minor modifications to a drug, 
known as “evergreening,” is a tactic that would not work in India, saying that 
marketing the modified version of Gleevec, also known as Glivec, “fails in both 
the tests of invention and patentability.”78 
The WTO has an arbitration and mediation division that has jurisdiction 
over compulsory licensing disputes under the TRIPS Agreement.79  However, 
it has admitted that it cannot agree on how to settle the cases of compulsory 





75. Id.; Hiddleston, supra note 70. 
76. The Patents Act, 1970 § 3(d), No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (2017), 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPOAct/1_31_1_patent-act-1970-11march2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7ZJV-HP2H]. 
77. Padma, supra note 71. 
78. Id. 
79. See Disputes Concerning the TRIPS Agreement, WTO, https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/trips_e/intel5_e.htm [https://perma.cc/C9VG-J4DF]; Dispute Settlement 3.1 Overview, 
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. 43 (2003), https://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add11_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X7DS-CJ8Z] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019). 
80. See Little-Used ‘Par.6’ System Will Have Its Day, WHO Tells Intellectual Property and 
Health Review, WTO: 2010 NEWS ITEMS (Oct. 26–27, 2010), https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/news_e/news10_e/trip_26oct10_e.htm [https://perma.cc/BZ37-WTX3] (“The WTO Secretariat 
explained the legal difference between countries introducing laws to implement the system and their 
notifying the WTO that they have accepted the amendment.  The two are separate and do not depend 
on each other. . . .  When a country accepts the amendment, it effectively affirms that it accepts an 
additional flexibility in the TRIPS agreement, and that other countries have the legal right to use the 
system if they choose to do so.  Accepting the amendment does not mean that the country necessarily 
wants to use the system itself.  Nor does it mean the country has to implement the system through its 
own laws or regulations.”). 
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jurisdiction over international compulsory licensing disputes other than to ex-
ercise some quality control from time to time during spot inspections over drugs 
that are produced for import into the United States market.81 
IV.  GEORGIA-PACIFIC FRAMEWORK FOR COMPULSORY LICENSING DISPUTES 
When one considers that a violation of an involuntary, or compulsory, li-
cense82 is really an infringement case,83 we can review tests that currently exist 
to determine what damages, if any, an infringer should pay the patent holder.  
Recall that under the TRIPS Agreement and Doha Declaration, regardless of 
how expansive the ability is to obtain a compulsory license, the patent holder 
must still be given reasonable compensation.84  Furthermore, whether a frame-
work exists—either within that country or at the WTO—to analyze the com-
peting equities of the case to help the parties reach a resolution of the matter 
and a conclusion on reasonable compensation is still up for debate. 
Some outlying issues revolve around the definition of “adequate renumer-
ation in the circumstances,” which is referred to in the TRIPS Agreement.85  
Generally, this is considered the royalty on the license.86  If a license was not 
 
81. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.90 (2019) (governing the FDA’s regulatory authority over domestic 
manufacturers, repackaging of pharmaceuticals, and engagement in Memorandum of Understanding 
with foreign manufacturers); see also International Agreements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 7, 
2019), https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/international-arrangements 
[https://perma.cc/U8UB-Y4ZD] (discussing Cooperative Agreements and Memorandum of Under-
standing); Foreign Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (5/96): Guide to Inspection of Foreign Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.fda.gov/inspec-
tions-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/inspection-guides/foreign-
pharmaceutical-manufacturers-596 [https://perma.cc/D8UV-3T8T] (“[T]he authority to inspect for-
eign drug facilities does not come from Section 704 of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the Act,) but 
from the agency’s ability to exercise Section 801 of the Act and commitments made by the sponsors 
of applications, if applicable.  For that reason, the agency is not required to provide stringent docu-
mentary evidence to establish violations of the Act.  However, the inspection team is expected to col-
lect sufficient records to substantiate its findings and to aid in the further review process by the 
agency.”). 
82. See Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 5. 
83. See Icahn Sch. of Med. at Mount Sinai v. Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 
322, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that “Neurocrine’s grant of an unauthorized de facto sublicense 
that arose when Neurocrine transferred to AbbVie the right to exclusively direct and control use of the 
Sealfon drug discovery tools” alleged a prima facie case for damages and royalties). 
84. See discussion supra.  
85. Part II–Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property 
Rights, URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT: TRIPS, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips_04c_e.htm [https://perma.cc/UPV3-Z7DW] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).  Article 31(h) states that 
“the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into 
account the economic value of the authorization.”  Id. 
86. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (“[T]he recovery of a reasonable royalty for the very purpose of affording fair compensation in 
cases such as this, where the victimized patentee is unable to prove that he lost a measurable amount 
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obtained, it would be an infringement of the patent, and the party could sue for 
damages.87  In infringement cases, one approach to determine damages is to 
calculate what the reasonable royalty rate would have been had the license been 
obtained.88  Thus, damages are based on the amount of the product sold and the 
prejudice to the patent holder’s development of the patent.89 
This is not unlike the Indian Patent Act requirement that the patented in-
vention must be “worked in,” or manufactured in, the country.90  In the Novartis 
case, the Indian Supreme Court determined that Novartis was not even active 
in the market where the compulsory license was being used, or was so inactive, 
that the damages were negligible.91  What could also be relevant would be the 
sales in other markets in which the patent holder may become active.92 
What if the country only wants the license for use in a discrete market in 
their country, like for the extremely poor and underserved, much like how the 
Department of Health and Human Services in the United States serves the poor 
under Medicaid 93 and seeks to carve out government discount prices for this 
discrete group?  Recall the Cipro case, in which the United States government 
 
of profits as the result of the infringement.”); see also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
87. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1127 (“[A] reasonable royalty is an alternative way of 
recovering general compensatory damages and that it is not equitable or commensurable with actual 
damages computed in terms of demonstrably proved lost profits.”). 
88. See id.; see also Lucent Techs., Inc., 580 F.3d at 1324. 
89. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1141 (discussing the effect that the infringement had 
on the development of the product in a certain market).  “[T]he two most important factors to be con-
sidered in negotiating a license are ‘probably, the nature of the product’ and how competitive the mar-
ket was for that product.”  Id. 
90. See Rahul Chaudhry, Local Working of Patents in India: An Analysis, IAM (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://www.iam-media.com/local-working-patents-india-analysis [https://perma.cc/TVY8-PAEM]; 
Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (“The commercial relationship between the licensor and licen-
see, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether 
they are inventor and promoter.”); Peter Roderick & Allyson M. Pollok, India’s Patent Laws Under 
Pressure, 380 LANCET e2, e3 (Sept. 15, 2012) (commenting that the Indian Patent Act requires “that 
the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India”); see also The Patents Act, 1970 § 84, 
No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (2017), http://www.ipindia.nic.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPO-
Act/1_31_1_patent-act-1970-11march2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZJV-HP2H]. 
91. See Roderick & Pollok, supra note 90, at e3 (commenting on the Indian Patent Act and the 
view that “‘worked in the territory of India’ means ‘manufactured to a reasonable extent in India’”). 
92. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (“The licensor’s established policy and market-
ing program to maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting 
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.”). 
93. See Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-rebate-program/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/NZT5-MPGC] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (“The Medicaid Drug Rebate Program . . . 
is a program that includes . . . participating drug manufacturers that helps to offset the Federal and state 
costs of most outpatient prescription drugs dispensed to Medicaid patients.  Approximately 600 drug 
manufacturers currently participate in this program.”). 
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pressured Bayer to lower the price for government contract use, under the threat 
of imposing a compulsory license on the product.94 
There are several factors to consider in a licensing analysis, including mar-
ket size, target groups, ability to produce the product, amount sold, whether it 
is sold in a competing market, what profit would the company have made, ac-
tual versus lost profit and the like, and whether it is being exported to another 
market.95  Thus, the damages/royalty (or renumeration portion) of the breach of 
a compulsory license calls for a more nuanced approach. 
Arguably, the most detailed analysis of royalty damages in a patent in-
fringement case comes from the Georgia-Pacific case.96  It is the seminal case 
that identifies what a reasonable royalty would be in a patent infringement 
case.97  In Georgia-Pacific, the court compiled a list of factors to determine 
reasonable royalty rates.98  These factors have been “widely cited in patent lit-
igation, although . . . criticized for looking at the issue as if products required 
only one patent and ignored the royalty rate stacking present in many complex 
high technology products.”99  However, since we are examining a single drug 
patent, the shoe fits.  The Georgia-Pacific factors are: 
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent 
in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty. 
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents compara-
ble to the patent in suit. 
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; 
or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect 
to whom the manufactured product may be sold. 
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to main-
tain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention 
or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to pre-
serve that monopoly. 
 
94. See Reichman, supra note 39, at 250. 
95. See generally Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120–21 (“[T]here is a multiplicity of inter-
penetrating factors bearing upon the amount of a reasonable royalty.  But there is no formula by which 
these factors can be rated precisely in the order of their relative importance or by which their economic 
significance can be automatically transduced into their pecuniary equivalent.”). 
96. Id. at 1120 (discussing a dispute namely over patented wood products and plywood made 
from trees). 
97. See Glenn S. Newman et al., How Reasonable Is Your Royalty, J. ACCOUNTANCY (Sept. 1, 
2008) (noting that Mr. Newman is the principal in charge of Parente Randolph LLC’s Forensic & 
Litigation Services based practice in Philadelphia). 
98. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
99. Georgia-Pacific Factors, TECH. & IP L. GLOSSARY, http://www.ipglossary.com/glos-
sary/georgia-pacific-factors/#.XZLYQS2ZPxU [https://perma.cc/G4ZH-XVJL] (last visited Sept. 30, 
2019) (elaborating on the Georgia-Pacific factors). 
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5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, 
such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the 
same line of business; or whether they are inventor and promoter. 
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of 
other products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to 
the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and 
the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales. 
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license. 
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; 
its commercial success; and its current popularity. 
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes 
or devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar re-
sults. 
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commer-
cial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and 
the benefits to those who have used the invention. 
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and 
any evidence probative of the value of that use. 
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be custom-
ary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow 
for the use of the invention or analogous inventions. 
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the 
invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manu-
facturing process, business risks, or significant features or improve-
ments added by the infringer. 
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee 
(such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the in-
fringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily try-
ing to reach an agreement; that is, the amount that a prudent licen-
see - who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to 
manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented 
invention - would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be 
able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have 
been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a 
license.100 
The Georgia-Pacific factors provide a more structured analysis than the 
TRIPS Agreement and Doha Declaration, which left many terms undefined and 
 
100. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
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vague.101  Obviously, these factors would be up to a factfinder to determine.102  
However, they can be a useful tool in mediation and arbitration of compulsory 
licensing disputes by helping the parties employ a more objective and fact-
based approach.103 
With a more structured and uniform approach, a company can also look 
forward to some level of predictability in compulsory licensing disputes.  Com-
panies do not like vagueness because it breeds uncertainty.104  Pharmaceutical 
corporations detest uncertainty because it prohibits them from making concrete 
plans for allocating risk and making determinations of liability or exposure to 
patent challenges, as well as in royalty litigation.105  “[T]he IP landscape re-
mains decidedly murky, and the sector is not in for an easy time as it continues 
to fight its corner.”106 
In order to provide strategic planning regarding infringement litigation, li-
censing, and/or concession of the royalty owed, a patent holder also needs to 
know what types of evidence are required, including how many years the prod-
uct needs to be marketed in a certain country, and what the potential of that 
market—or market share—is in that country.107  For instance, if the market 
share is so slight, the company may not have made any effort to establish sales 
 
101. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 38, at 960. 
102. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1121 (“In discharging its responsibility as fact finder, 
the Court has attempted to exercise a discriminating judgment reflecting its ultimate appraisal of all 
pertinent factors in the context of the credible evidence”.). 
103. See id. (commenting on using a fact-based approach).  In comparison to the fact-based 
approach outlined in Georgia-Pacific, in India, there is what has been described as a hit or miss ap-
proach used by pharmaceutical companies seeking to do business in India.  See generally Ravinder 
Gabble & Jillian Clare Kohler, “To Patent or Not to Patent? The Case of Novartis’ Cancer Drug 
Glivec in India,” 10 GLOBAL HEALTH 1, 2 (2014). 
104. Brian D. Smith, Managing Pharma’s Uncertainty, PMLIVE (July 25, 2014), 
http://www.pmlive.com/pharma_news/managing_pharmas_uncertainty_588689 
[https://perma.cc/LP8U-GEMZ] (“Historically, strategic planning in life sciences has been about esti-
mating risks and placing bets accordingly; the best estimators won a blockbuster.  But what about 
when, as now, a period of intense turbulence makes some risks, especially long term and strategic risks, 
impossible to estimate?”).  
105. See, e.g., Dylan Scott, Supreme Court’s Ruling in Patent Case a Blow to Drug Industry, 
STAT NEWS: POLITICS (June 20, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/06/20/supreme-court-rules-
against-drug-industry-in-patent-case/ [https://perma.cc/V3D8-HFNZ] (commenting that “uncertainty 
. . . stifles innovation” in the pharmaceutical industry (citing Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 
S. Ct. 2131 (2016) with regard to uncertainty in reviewing patent claims) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Smith, supra note 104 (commenting that quantitative data is easier to use to track 
risks associated with bringing a pharmaceutical product to market and managing it throughout its pa-
tent lifecycle).  See generally Helen Sloan, More Fears for Pharma IP Rights in India as Novartis 
Heads for the Supreme Court, IAM (Aug. 20, 2012), https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/more-
fears-pharma-ip-rights-india-novartis-heads-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/T2WZ-KBV5]. 
106. Sloan, supra note 105. 
107. See generally Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
1_21_20 MCKENZIE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/20  2:45 PM 
170 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 23:2 
 
or production in that country, and thus, the company would not have any dam-
ages. 
Additionally, the Georgia-Pacific factors take into consideration the issue 
of “evergreening.”108  Georgia-Pacific factor (9) states: “The utility and ad-
vantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had 
been used for working out similar results.”109  If the product that is allegedly 
infringed actually has no discernable additional market value or improvement 
over the previous product, under Georgia-Pacific, the damages would also be 
negligible.110  An infringement of a patent that is only incrementally different 
is dispositive for the party bringing the infringement case.111 
LMICs have been critical of the practice of “evergreening” and extending 
patent protection by adding marginally valuable changes to the patented inven-
tion, such as an enteric coating, splitting the product into twice a day delivery 
system, or adding a non-active irrelevant ingredient for the purpose of extend-
ing the patent life.112  Regarding the effect of “working in” or producing, sell-
ing, and manufacturing a product in a specific market, we look to Georgia-
Pacific factors (4) and (6), which state: 
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain 
his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by 
granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that mo-
nopoly. 
. . . 
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other 
products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licen-
sor as a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of 
such derivative or convoyed sales.113 
Thus, the factors provide a more detailed description of “worked in” than 
the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration, and other countries’ amended 
Paris Convention agreements.  For instance, “Bayer acquired an importing 
 
108. See Collier, supra note 70, at E385–86. 
109. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
110. See id. at 1121 (“[T]he patentee could ‘show the value by proving what would have been 
a reasonable royalty, considering the nature of the invention, its utility and advantages, . . . the extent 
of the use involved’ . . . [,] and commercial value as evidenced by its advantages over other devices 
. . . .”). 
111. See, e.g., id. at 1138 (commenting that a product that was completely different than 
Weldtex or GP Striated did not, therefore, have a bearing on the license infringement issue before the 
court). 
112. See Collier, supra note 70, at E385 (discussing evergreening and the impact on developing 
countries). 
113. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
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license for Nexavar—the company’s brand name for sorafenib tosylate—in 
2007” (which is approved for the treatment of kidney cancer).114  The patent 
was granted one year later.115  Bayer claimed that Nexavar’s sales in India were 
undermined by the marketing of a similar drug by another domestic generic 
producer, CIPLA, which Bayer sued for infringement.116  However, according 
to the Indian Patent Office, Bayer did not begin importing the drug into India 
in 2008 and had only small quantities on hand during the following two years.117  
The Indian Patent Office determined that Bayer did not “take adequate steps to 
start the working of the invention in the territory of India on a commercial scale 
and to an adequate extent.”118 
In terms of “adequate compensation,” the world of compulsory licensing 
becomes even murkier.  Compensation is deemed reasonable within the context 
of the sales in that particular territory.119  Georgia-Pacific also provides a more 
detailed analysis in this area under factors (2), (8), (12), (13), and (15), which 
each state: 
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable 
to the patent in suit. 
. . . 
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its 
commercial success; and its current popularity. 
. . . 
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be custom-
ary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for 
the use of the invention or analogous inventions. 
. . . 
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the 
invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufac-
turing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements 
added by the infringer. 
. . . 
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee 
(such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringe-
ment began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach 
an agreement; that is, the amount that a prudent licensee - who desired, 
 






119. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1124 (beginning the reasonable royalty rate analysis 
with the amount of sale in the territory in question). 
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as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a 
particular article embodying the patented invention – would have been 
willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit 
and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee 
who was willing to grant a license.120 
Therefore, the factors provide us with an economic and factual analysis, 
rather than a vague statement of “the patent holder must be paid adequately.”  
These factors point to an analysis in the context of what has been paid before, 
what is traditionally the going price for a license in the specific market, what 
does a manufacturer of generics typically make in profits, and what, if any, 
would they be willing to pay to license the drug to produce it domestically.  
This analysis fleshes out the statutory protections afforded to a patent holder 
when the patent is infringed.121  This structured analysis provides a starting 
point for a fact-based economic analysis that uses historical data. 
Georgia-Pacific also provides for the use of expert testimony to analyze 
and assist the factfinder in determining a contested issue.122  It also examines 
the nature of the invention and whether it provides any appreciable difference 
to the consumer, as stated in factors (10) and (14): 
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commer-
cial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the 
benefits to those who have used the invention. 
. . . 
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.123 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the equities of pharmaceutical companies and the interests 
of consumers in LMICs, as well as the countries themselves, cannot be more 
diametrically opposed to one another.  At the same time, a statutory scheme has 
laid out a solution to affordability and availability in the form of compulsory 
licensing.  If pharmaceutical companies hope to navigate these murky waters 
and seek to regain any portion of their lost profits, they would do well to study 
the Georgia-Pacific factor analysis as they prepare to argue their case under the 
authority of the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration, and local govern-
ment patent laws. 
 
120. Id. at 1120. 
121. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compul-
sory Licensing, supra note 51, at 8. 
122. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1117. 
123. Id. at 1120. 
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Similarly, the WTO has expressed frustration with the mediation and arbi-
tration division in terms of settlement of compulsory licensing disputes.  The 
Doha Declaration expanded the rights of licensees, but left little concrete ex-
planations of the terms “adequate,” “emergency,” and “urgent situations.” 
The uncertainty within the Doha Declaration does not lend itself to the set-
tlement of cases.  In some ways, the solution to compulsory licensing can seem 
as difficult as “seeing a forest through the trees.”124  There are so many com-
peting interests, and so much at stake, that it seems impossible to pick out sali-
ent issues for parties to agree upon.  Without a fact-based and clear-eyed anal-
ysis, mediation of these disputes cannot make any headway.  Rather, it leads to 
more litigation. 
Notably, the Novartis case lasted several years before the issue was settled.  
If countries believe that the availability and affordability of medications is a 
pressing public health issue, they would do well to tighten up the definitions 
and requirements of compulsory licensing, so parties may have a clear roadmap 
to navigate these highly contested issues. 
With a fact-based framework, such as Georgia-Pacific as a guide, the WTO 
can apply a more comprehensive and fact-based analysis to compulsory licens-
ing disputes.  If the WTO wishes to reengage in international mediation and 
arbitration in these complex disputes, adopting a mediation framework—as laid 
out in Georgia-Pacific—would help each party understand the key issues in 
dispute.  In this way, parties may be able to realistically understand their expo-
sure, realistically understand their obligations under their agreements, and ap-
proach negotiations much sooner, rather than litigate these issues while the gen-
eral public in their country suffers under the high cost of medications. 
The WTO should consider amending the Doha Declaration with more fact-
specific criteria for the issuance of a compulsory license, criteria to challenge 
the license, as well as historical fact-based information to determine the reason-
able compensation for the patent holder.  With such a fact-based and detailed 
framework for analyzing this complex issue, patent holders will be better in-
formed of their rights and licensees can become better-informed stakeholders.  
Both the drug company and the LMIC are stakeholders in this quasi-contractual 
agreement called a compulsory license—an agreement created by the pressing 
public health need for medication, availability, and affordability. 
 
124. See the Forest for the Trees, WIKTIONARY, https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/see_the_for-
est_for_the_trees [https://perma.cc/49BD-HTC7] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019); see also Miss the Forest 
for the Trees, REVERSO ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.reverso.net/english-defini-
tion/miss%20the%20forest%20for%20the%20trees [https://perma.cc/9UHF-QU4A] (last visited Sept. 
21, 2019).  This phrase can also mean that one is so focused on the details or intricacies of something 
that they miss the big picture or the main point.  See the Forest for the Trees, supra note 124. 
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By adopting the reasoned, carefully laid out framework as presented in 
Georgia-Pacific, and using it to determine a fair compensation in compulsory 
licensing, it can allow factfinders, mediators, and stakeholders to find the “for-
est through the trees” among the complex competing equities within the myriad 
of details of international compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. 
 
